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1. Surnmaryo Petitioner challenges CA6's invalidation of 
two of its employment policies relating to the treatment of 
pregnant women. 
*Judge Engel was listed as a member of the panel that heard 
this case but he did not participate in the consideration of the 
~ /kJ ~ci:~  ~~ 0-tc_ ' ' . ' 




2. Facts. Respon ent became pregnant while she was employea 
by petitioner. Pursuant to company regulations, she was forced 
to take a leave of abs ence 25 days before the expected birth 
date of her child. This forced leave of absence is not at issue. 
Petitioner provides each employee with a number of sick 
leave days based on seniority. Pregnant employees who are 
on maternity leaves may not receive any accumulated sick pay 
but may be paid their accumulated vacation time during their 
absence. Moreover, a woman taking a maternity leave does not 
retain her seniority for the purpose of bidding on a permanent 
{wl;e~ .. s/~ . J S read( fC> re lt.~r-11 -fow~rl<) 
position) although ·she is given priority over non-employees. 
0~ she is rehired fo~a permanent posiJion, ~he J ·c.Js bacK_the 
seniority she had accumulated before her maternity leave. 
In this case, after respondent had her child, she attempted 
to return to work. She bid for three permanent permanent positions 
but was outbid in each case by an employee who did not have 
her seniority because her seniority is not restored until she 
obtains a permanent position. 
Respondent filed a complaint with the EEOC which eventually 
issueda right to sue letter. The district court found that 
the petitioner's refusal to permit respondent to use her accum-
ulated sick leave during her maternity leave and its refusal 
to permit respondent to retain her seniority for the purpose 
of bidding on a permanent position after her maternity leave 
'"k 
violated Title VII. CA6 affirmed on the basis of an EEOC regulation. 
3. Contentions. Petitioner contends that the decision of 
CA6 conflicts with this Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 
4l?.u~s. 484 (1974), presents issues similar to those presented 
-----------------------
. . ')'~29 C. F. R. § 160~. 10 (b) provides in pertinent part: "(b) Disabi l -
1t1es caused or contr1buted to by pregnancy ••• are, for all job-
related purpos e s, temporary disabilities and should be treated as 
such under any • o o sick leave plan available in connection with 
employment. Written and unwritten employment policies and prac-
. ; 
-3-
by Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, No. 74-1245 (cert. 
granted, May 27, 1975), and raises distinct issues of funda-
mental importance in the administration of Title VII. The basic 
contention of petitioner is that Geduldig settled that "the ex-
clusion of normal .pregnancy from a disability benefits plan 
does not constitute sex based discrimination •••• " Petition 
at 6. 
4. Discussion. Geduldig is not controlling because it 
rested on an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
( $ 11 rt_'1 ) 
This casefwas distinguished by CA6 from Wetzel and from General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert and Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 
Nos. 74-1589 & 74-1590 (cert. granted October 6, 1975), and from 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Communications Workers 
of America, No. 74-1601 (held for Gilbert) on the grounds that 
petitioner, unlike the companies in those cases, has no disability 
i~come protection plan for its employees. It is unclear 
whether the plan at issue in Soc. Service Employees Union, Local 
371 v. Women in City Gov. United, No. 75-70, and United Fed. of 
Teachers v. Women in City Gov. United, No. 75-71, both being 
held for Gilbert, is similar to that in AT&T. CA6, nevertheless, 
followed Wetzel, Gilbert and AT&T in distinguishing Geduldig 
and in following the EEOC guidelines. 
This case is distinguishable from the granted cases 
tices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of 
leave, the availability of extensions, and accrual of seniority 
and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment 
under any •.• sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be 
applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the 
same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary 
disabilities." 
because the policy attacked is not a disaBLiicy income pro-
tection plan. Instead, the only question is whether a pregnant 
~ay be denied the use of her accrued sick leave when ~ 
she is compelled to take a maternity leave or whether she 
can use only her accrued vacation leave. Whether this 
petition is a hold for Gilbert or a possible grant and 
consolidate depends on whether the distinctive features of 
e. 
the plan are crucial, and w1{her the Court w111 'hold that 
the EEOC exceeded its grant of authority when it made a deter-
mination that pregnancy distinctions are sex-based distinctions. 
If 29 C.F.R. §1604.10(b) is within the EEOC's authority, 
the court of appeals' decision would appear to be correct. 
Apparently, the petitioner-employer gave no justification 
to CA6 for treating pregi nancy-related leaves differently from ........ 
other disability-related leaves with respect to retaining senior-
ity for the purpose of bidding for a permanent position when 
the employee is able to return to work or with respect to 
use of accrued sick leave. 
There is no response. 
11/18/75 Murasky Ops in petn appx. 
January 7, 1977 Conf. 
Heretofore held for Nos. 74-1589 and 74-1590, General Electric 
v. Gilbert and Gilbert v. General Electric Co. 
(3) Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, qo. 75-536_ 6-. V.'/- Jlf. 
Petitioner company in this case has a policy that 
pregnant employees who are on maternity leaves 
may not receive any accumulated sick pay, although 
such employees may be paid their accumulated 
vacation time during this absence. Further, an 
employee taking a maternity leave does not retain 
accumulated seniority for the purpose of bidding 
on a permanent position (although priority is 
given over non-emp~oyees). Once rehired for a 
permanent position the employee gets back the 
seniority accumulated prior to the maternity leave. 
In this case , respondent, after having her child, 
l sought three permanent positions, but was outbid i~ each ase by an emplo ee who had less sen1ority than responden woul ave had · ha s e been g1ven 
credit for her pre - maternity leave seniority . 
She brought this suit claiming that the refusal 
to allow her to use accumulated sick leave, as 
well as the refusal to allow seniority for purposes 
of bidding on a.permanent position at the conclusion 
of the maternity leave, violated Title VII. The 
District Court agreed, and the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed. The Sixth Circuit noted that this case 
was different than Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Wetzel, 511 F.2d 199 (CA 3 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 
737, AT&T, supra, and General Electric, in that 
petitioner in this case had no disability benefits 
·plan for its employees . The Sixth Circuit did 
agree with those cases both in distinguishing 
Geduldig and in following the EEOC guidelines. As 
I see no reason to grant this case to consider 
these factual twists until the lower courts have 
had an opportunity to digest General Electric, I 
will vote to grant, vacate, and remand for 
reconsideration in light of General Electric. 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ... ..... ...... ..... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 75-536 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced .. .............. , 19 .. . 
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1st DRAFT 
· Circulated: /- /£7 7 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~irculated: 
NASHVILLE GAS COMPANY v. NORA D. SATTY 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT 'OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
No. 75-536. Decided January -, 1977 
MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
The Court grants the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacates 
the judgment below and remands the case for reconsideration 
in light of our decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 
- U. S. L. W. -. Because the case involves an important 
issue as to which Gilbert is unilluminating, I would simply 
grant the petition. 
As I understand our decision in Gilbert, it rests on the 
simple factual proposition that the failure to include preg-
nancy in the health benefit plans provided by the General 
Electric Co. for its employees has neither the purpose nor the 
effect of discriminating against women. See Richmond Uni-
fied School District v. Berg, No. 75-1069 (WHITE, J., dissent-
ing). Under petitioner's policy involved in this case, em--ployees who take pregancy leaves lose their seniority for the 
purpose oi"15Iactmg on permanent os1h ons. Smce' men do not 
get pregnant, the po wy Impacts women differently than it 
impacts men; and since, as a result of the policy, they may 
not receive permanent positions, the policy has the effec of 
disadvantaging womeu as com are wit their male coem-
ployees m o taming jobs. A discriminatory effect IS thus 
clearly shown liere. I would grant the petition anq consoli-
date this case with Richmond Unified School Board v. Berg, 
~pra, for oral argument. 
-------
C HAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~up-rtm.t <!fcurl cf tqt ~ttittb .itaf:tg 
'JtagJri:ttghttt. lB. <!f. 20~)!.~ 
January 19, 1977 
Re: No. 75-536 - Nashville Gas Compa ny v. Satty 
Dear John: 
When this case appears on the order list would you 
please note the following: 
"Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari 
and set the case for argument. 11 
Sincerely, 
-
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
... 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.$)u:prtm:t ~ourl of t4t ~nittb ~fattg 
~rutltittgfctt. lB. <!f. 2ll?'-1~ I 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN January 19, 1977 
Re: No. 75-536 - Nashville Gas Company v. Satty 
Dear John: 
When this case appears on the order list would you 
please note the following: 
"Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari 
and set the case for argument." 
Sincerely, 
-
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!IERS Of" 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN • .JR. January 19, 1977 
RE: No. 75-536 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
v · 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
~ttprtnu <!fou.rt of tlrt ~h .§taft~ 
1lhudtinghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll,?'l-c1 
CHAMI!ERS 01'" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 21, 1977 
Re: No. 75-536, Nashville Gas Company v. Satty 
Dear Byron: 




Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§upunu Qfttttrlllf fltt ~ttif:th .§htftg 
~agJ:ringhm. :!9. <!J. 2!l.;T~~ 
January 21, 1977 
Re: 75-536 - Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 
75-1069 - Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg 
Dear Byron: 
Although I do not read the General Electric 
opinion the way you and those who have joined your 
dissent do, I nevertheless am persuaded that we should 
grant certiorari in these two cases. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
'• 
.•' ~ 









;,January 21, 1977 
·t 
No. 75-1069 Richmond Unified Schoo.l Dist. 
~t .. ~. ·· ·~--------v_. __ s_o_n_j_a __ L_y_n_n_B_e_r~g~~-------. 
~75-536 Nashville Gas Company v. Satty 
Dear Byron: 
Your dissenting opinions have persuaded 
me. I now agree that we should grant petitions in 
both of these cases and consolidate them for oral 
argument. 
dissents. 
In any event, please join me in your 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
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7/26/77 
No. 75-536, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 
This is dictated after reviewing the briefs in the above 
case. It is merely an ''aid to memory" rather than an analysis. 
Any view expressed or implied is quite tentative. 
* * * * * 
Here on certiorari from CA6, this case was a "hold" for 
Gilbert v. General Electric. Although one of the issues decided 
by CA6 is now controlled by GE (see below), the facts are suf-
ficiently different to present an issue not necessarily controlled 
by GE. 
After complying with EEOC procedures, respondent -- a 
clerk with Nashville Gas (petitioner) -- brought this suit under 
Title VII alleging sex discrimination. Respondent was granted 
"pregnancy leave'' on December 29, 1972, 25 days before her child 
was born. Petitioner did not have a disability plan as such, but 
did have a sick leave plan for the benefit of employees absent from 
work due to non-occupational sickness or injury for a specified 
number of days based on seniority. When such an employee is able 
to resume work, he or she customarily is returned to the job 
No. 75-536 2 . 
previously held although the company does not concede any obligation 
to hold jobs open for extended periods of time. Moreover, an em-
ployee who returns to work from sick leave retains full seniority. 
Pregnancy is not treated as sickness or injury under the 
company's sick leave plan. Rather, a pregnant employee is granted 
a leave of absence that the company states is similar to leaves of 
absence granted employees (apparently optionally) for causes other 
than sickness or injury (e.g., to complete education). 
Without checking the record more carefully, it is not clear 
to me whether the company's policy with respect to treatment accorded 
women returning from pregnancy leave is formalized. There is no dis-
pute as to the treatment accorded respondent. When she was placed 
on pregnancy leave, her position was not filled in view of the con-
verting of certain accounting functions to computers. Some six weeks 
after her child was born, the company did provide respondent with 
temporary work for one month. Thereafter, in order to collect unem-
ployment insurance, respondent requested the company to change her 
employment status from pregnancy leave to termination, which the 
company did (appendix 31). Before she was terminated, and following 
the birth of her child, respondent applied for three full-time 
positions which became available. In each case, a permanent female 
employee with seniority was awarded the position, although if 
respondent had retained her job-bidding seniority, she would have 
been entitled to the position (appendix 33). 
CA6 decided this case, affirming the DC's judgment in 
favor of respondent, before Gilbert was decided. It distinguished 
No. 75-536 3. 
Geduldig. Respondent now concedes that "petitioner's sick leave 
plan is for all intents and purposes the same as the plan 
examined in Gilbert." 
no longer an issue. 
(Brief p.8.) Thus, denial of sick pay is 
But respondent argues that "disparate treatment" in other 
respects, following pregnancy, constitutes discrimination violative 
of Title VII. Respondent contrasts the difference in treatment 
accorded employees who return from "sick leave" with the treatment 
accorded a woman returning -- or attempting to return -- from 
pregnancy leave. In the former situation, the returnee is "generally" 
placed in the same position, receives any pay raises that may have 
taken effect during the absence, and is entitled to the same 
seniority which he or she had earned prior to the absence (appendix 17-
19) • 
A woman returning from pregnancy leave, however, is not 
entitled to resume her prior position. She is "permitted 
to return to work when a permanent position for which she is 
qualified becomes available and when no employee then permanently 
employed is bidding on the opening." (Pet. brief p. 4; cf. 
resp. brief p. 13.) If a woman returning from pregnancy leave is 
re-employed, she retains previously accumulated seniority with 
respect to pensions, vacations, and certain other benefits. She 
does not retain "accumulated seniority for job-bidding purposes." 
Petitioner views the issue as being limited to whether 
failure to provide ''job-bidding" seniority constitutes sex discrimi-
nation. Respondent views it somewhat more expansively: whether the 
No. 75-536 4. 
total disparity of the treatment of employees returning from sick 
leave and women returning from pregnancy leave constitutes unlawful 
discrimination. Respondent also argues that company policy is a 
pretext to discriminate. 
It is not clear to me, from a preliminary reading of the 
briefs, whether respondent claims any right to re-employment 
following pregnancy. Apparently there is no such enforceable right 
following sick leave, although company policy is to re-
employ. Apparently the company is not obligated to re-employ in 
either case. The essence of respondent's claim of discrimination 
is loss of seniority (brief p.9). Thus, if full sepiority had been 
accorded respondent when job vacancies occurred, she would have 
been re-employed. 
Petitioner argues, as would be expected, that the rationale 
of Gilbert is controlling as to the seniority issue just as respondent 
concedes it to be controlling as to sick pay itself. If there is 
no discrimination in classifying pregnancy differently for purposes 
of sick pay, petitioner argues with a good deal of logic that there 
can be no discrimination with respect to re-employment. 
But the issue certainly is not free from doubt. Indeed, 
we granted certiorari because of this factual distinction. I intend 
to examine the briefs more carefully, and to re-read Gilbert and 
Geduldig. 
I also will welcome the thoughts of my clerk. 
-
"' ... . - ... 
.., . . . ' . . 
j .. 
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1. Summaryo Petitioner challenges CA6's invalidation of 
two of its employment policies relating to the treatment of 
pregnant women. 
*Judge Engel was listed as a member of the panel that heard 
this case but he did not participate in the consideration of the 
r/ ~ 1 decision. ~ 
~ ~ l {~ Au,'t:<_o_Q_ 9-AL- • ' ' 
~ r --ti~ .M -~ flo. Hoc_ ~ ~ 
~fd_::~~-~~~ 
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~ ~ ~  1 ~ EfOc M .~ · 
_iA ~ ~ CA-/Y24 . 'J1 '-1h C£ o L ...-w ~ 
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~ -:c CZeR_ AVJ r Ju._ IX-
~ ~ 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher 
BENCH MEMO 
Date: Sept. 30, 1977 
No.75-536, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty; 
No. 75-1069, Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg 
I. THRESHOLD QUESTIONS 
The threshold questions relate only to the Berg case. 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ( $~ -1 ~ • c.Q....) 
Petrsraise a number of technical arguments challenging the 
~... :we -
DC's assumption of jurisdiction in this case. Chronology is 
important here, and I offer the following table for your 
guidance: 
Nov. 15, 1975--Berg filed a charge with the EEOC. 
Dec. 13, 1972--Petr school dist. 's governing bd approved a 
proposed interim maternity leave policy. 
Dec. 14, 1972--Berg notified petr that she was pregnant and 
requested a pregnancy leave to begin February 23, 1973, one 
month before expected due date. 
Dec. 20, 1972--Berg submitted a further request supported 
by a statement from her physician. 
Dec. 27, 1972--School Dist. responded by requesting that 
Berg submit to a physical examination by the school dist. 
doctor. 
Jan. 12, 1973--Berg's counsel requests "right to sue" 
letter from EEOC. 
February 5, 1973--Berg brought suit in DC, raising claims 
under §§1981, 1983, 14th Amendment and Title VII, with 
jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. §§1331, 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. 
§2000(e)-5(f) 
February 8 1973--Berg moved for a prelim inj. 
February 21, 1973--Berg received a "right to sue" letter. 
February 22, 1973--DC granted resp's motion for a prelim 
inj. 
April 23, 1973--Berg filed a motion styled "Supplement to 
Complaint". 
June 8, 1973--DC granted Berg's "Supplement to Complaint." 
July 30, 1973--DC denied motion to aismiss on 
jurisdictional grounds. 
2. 
August 31, 1973--DC granted summary judgment and perm 1n]. 
December 14, 1973--DC granted judgment certifying class 
action. 
Petr argues that the DC lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because the EEOC charge was filed prematurely, 42 u.s.c. .... ,... 
§2000e-5(e); (2) the charge was not made under oath, id. 
§2000e-5(b); and (3) resp instituted a Title VII action without 
meeting the statutory prerequisite of receipt of a "right to 
-------------------~ --------~----------~ 
sue" letter from the EEOC, id. §2000e-5(f). 
CA9 affirmed the DC's assumption of jurisdiction on three, 
alternative grounds. (1) The DC had independent subject matter 
jurisdiction to issue a prelim inj under 28 u.s.c. §1343(3) and 
§1983, in light of resp's substantial constitutional claim. --Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974); Goosby v. Osser, 
409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973). (2) The DC had jurisdiction under 
Title VII itself to issue a prelim inj pending disposition by 
the EEOC of the underlying charge of discrimination. Drew v. 
Liberty Mutual Insur. Co., 480 F.2d 69, 72-76 (CAS 1973). (3) 
Finally, the later issuance of the "right to sue" letter 
coupled with the filing of a supplemental complaint operated to 
cure any initial jurisdictional defect. Henderson v. Eastern 
Freight Ways, Inc., 460 F.2d 258, 260 (CA 4 1972), cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 912 (1973) . 
In my view, ground (2) is inconsistent with the statutory 
design, but it is unnecessary to the result. It would seem that 
I 
the D~dict~n ~ iss.:.!e t_::e 
the §§1983, 1981 claims. The prelim inj issued on February 22, 
prelim inj on the basis of 
1973, a day after resp received the "right to sue" letter, but 
3. 
apparently no motion was made at that time to amend or 
supplement the complaint. The February 22 inj was not premised 
on Title VII jurisdiction (Petn, App. C, at 32), although 
intervening §1983 cases in this Court (City of Kenosha v. 
Bruno) led the DC to reexamine its §1983 jurisdiction and 
develop the pendente lite theory as a post-hoc rationalization 
(id. at 37). The other relief in the case was awarded after the 
motion to supplement the complaint had been granted. Petr 
offers no direct authority that under the circumstances, the DC 
should have entered a formal dismissal and required 
commencement of a new action. 
B. Should Berg be "DIG'd"? 
I am not "DIG"-happy, but I cannot understand why cert. was 
granted in Berg. First, a Calif. statute effective January 1, 
1976 requires that pregnancy be treated in the same fashion as 
any other temporary disability for all job-related purposes. 
(see Petn, App.D, at 52-53). Second, shortly before resp filed 
her complaint in DC, petr had formulated an interim maternity 
leave policy to replace what was an inflexible, LaFleur-like 
policy. (The interim policy is set out at Petn, App.A, at 2-3). 
This is not a case where the school district imposed a 
mandatory maternity leave several months in advance of the 
expected due date. As I read the record, petr school dist. 
indicated that it might extend the 30-day period established in 
the interim policy, but insisted that resp submit to an 
examination by a school dist. physician. Resp refused to do so. 
The maternity leave issue in this case boils to the question of 
whether a school district may condition an extension of a 
4. 
30-day mandatory maternity leave upon submission to a physical 
examination by the district's physician. Third, in addition to 
the jurisdictional quagmire that I have just whizzed through, 
the record is poorly developed at points. For example, 
notwithstanding the DC's contrary finding (Petn, App.C, at 34), 
I find it hard to disbelieve petr school dist.'s assertion that 
it also subjects employees suffering certain non-pregnancy 
disabilities to examination by its own physician. Fourth, the 
maternity leave issue as present in this case is not 
particularly interesting, and seems answered by dicta in 
Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur (at least as a matter of 
due process). The other issue in the case --denial of sick 
leave pay-- is present in Nashville Gas. 
II. THE MERITS 
A. The Impact of Gilbert 
The Nashville Gas and Berg cases turn, of course, on the 
reach of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, No. 74-1589 (decided 
December 7, 1976), 429 U.S. 125. There are many ways of reading 
Gilbert. As in the poem of love, let me count the ways: 
1. The uniqueness of pregnancy. There is much reliance in 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136, 139, and its intellectual forebear, 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 u.s. 484, 496-97 & n.20 (1974), on the 
view that pregnancy is different, because it is a 
gender-specific condition as to which there is no comparable 
class of males. Consequently, it might be argued, pregnancy 
classifications can never constitute "sex discrimination" or 
"discrimination based on sex." 
This concept of uniqueness, however, cannot be taken to its 
5. 
logical extreme. I doubt whether the Court would uphold a 
public school board's decision to discharge permanentl~a 
teacher solely because of the onset of pregnancy. Refusals to 
hire, rehire, train, promote, etc. solely on grounds of a 
previous pregnancy similarly would be suspect. The law is 
fairly clear that the fact that an employer's discriminatory 
practice affects only a subclass of one sex does not bar a 
finding of discriminatory purpose or effect. See, e.g., 
Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (refusal 
to hire mothers of pre-school age children); Sprogis v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (CA 7), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
991 (1971) (discharge of woman for getting married). These 
cases did not involve a gender-specific condition, but I 
believe they stand for broader proposition asserted above. 
These practices, if perpetrated by public officials, would not 
pass muster under "rational basis" scrutiny. See Cleveland 
Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 634, 651 (1974) (Powell, 
J., concurring in the result). And, in my view, Gilbert does 
not shield such practices. 
2. An insurance, cost-justification case. At the other 
extreme, there is the view, shared by resps in Nashville Gas 
and Berg, that Gilbert is to be confined to its narrow facts. 
Thus, Gilbert is said to hold that an employer's disability 
insurance program which is underinclusive with respect to the ,, 
risk of pregnancy is lawful under Title VII as a cost-justified 
,, 
employment practice. Undoubtedly, this was the operative ,.....,.._.... 
setting for both Gilbert and Geduldig, and insurance concepts 
pervade much of the discussion in both decisions. See Gilbert, 
6. 
429 U.S. at 130-31 & n.9, 134, 135-36, 138: Geduldig, 417 U.S. 
at 493-97. While insurance concepts and cost considerations 
~were important to the outcome of each case, and the absence of 
~ these factors in a case might yield a different result, Gilbert 
~ 
rests on a somewhat broader rationale. 
3. Pregnancy classifications as not per se discriminatory, 
whether in purpose or effect. As I read Gilbert, the Court 
held that classifications based on pregnancy -- a sex-specific 
condition -- do not, without more, constitute sex-based 
discrimination. Such classifications, standing alone, are 
discriminatory neither in purpose nor effect, even though only 
women are affected. A successful Title VII action requires an 
independent showing of discriminatory purpose or disparate, 
____..,. ~ .. ______.. ~,...-,.... ....... ,....., """$ WE ,._,_-,--
detrimental impact on women. J. Rehnquist stated this point 
with fair clarity: 
We recognized in Geduldig, of course, that the fact that 
there was not sex-based discrimination as such was not the 
end of the analysis should it be shown "that distinctions 
involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an 
invidious dLscrimination against the members of one sex on 
the other. 
* * * * 
Since gender-based discrimination had not been shown to 
exist either by the terms of the plan or by its effect, 
there was no need to reach the question of what sort of 
standard would govern our review had there been such a 
showing. 
429 U.S. at 135 (emphasis supplied). 
The Gilbert Court found no record support for a finding of 
"pretext" or effect. As to the former, the exclusion of 
pregnancy from insurance coverage did not constitute a sub rosa 
sex discrimination because pregnancy is a unique disability. 
~ ~~-------'-------------
"But we have here no questions of excluding a disease or 
disability comparable in all respects to covered diseases or 
7. 
disabilities and yet confined to the members of one race or 
sex." 429 u.s. at 136. 
Similarly, "resps [had] not made the requisite showing of 
gender-based effects," 429 U.S. at 137. "As there is no proof 
that the package is in fact worth more to men than to women, it 
~------------~----------~---~_.------~----------------------~----.. is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in 
this case simply because women disabled as a result of 
pregnancy do not receive benefits •.•. " Id. at 138. 
Now for the more difficult task of applying Gilbert to the 
cases at hand. Nashville Gas and Berg present three ~fferent ) 
practices: (1) denial of accumulated job-bidding senior1tyA (2) 
denial of accumulated paid sick leave, and (3} a requirement of 
mandatory maternity leave. 
B. Denial of Accumulated Job-Bidding Seniority (Nashville Gas) 
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, petr maintained an 
essentially two-tier leave policy: (1) "sick leave," and (2) 
"leave 6f absence." (There may also have been a leave policy 
for disability due to on-the-job injury, which is not pertinent 
here). As to the former, the DC found, "defendant maintains a 
policy of allowing leave in connection with non-work related 
illness or injury without loss of seniority or other indicia of 
good standing on the part of an employee where the non-work 
related disability does not concern pregnancy. It is only in 
the case of pregnancy that an employee is denied the 
opportunity to take 'sick leave.'" (App. 44). As to the latter, 
petr enforces a mandatory maternity leave policy (not directly 
in issue in this case). While some provision is made for 
reemployment of a returning mother on a temporary basis until a 
low-seniority permanent position opens up and 
8. 
retention of seniority for purposes of vacations and pensions, 
.. \\ 
the returning mother loses her job-bidding seniority and is - -
denied accumulated sick leave pay. Notwithstanding what seems 
to be a contrary finding by the DC (App. 45), it appears that 
employees seeking a leave for education, travel or other 
personal, non-disability reason are treated in the same fashion 
as pregnant women. 
The DC held that Title VII had been violated because: 
(1) only pregnant women are required to take leave and 
thereby lose job bidding seniority and no leave is required 
in other non-work related disabilities; and 
(2) only pregnant women are denied sick leave benefits 
while in all other cases of non-work related disability 
sick leave benefits are available. 
(App. 51). 
The court also found that "[petr] has introduced no proof 
of any business necessity in support of these discriminatory 
policies. The court must therefore assume no justification 
exists" (App. 51). 
Petr contends that its policy is one of "favor[ing] those 
employees who are actively working for the company at the time 
a job opening becomes available to the detriment of those 
employees on leave of absence, including maternity leave" (Br. 
26), and that, unlike Gilbert, the impact of its practice does 
not fall exclusively upon women (id. 24). In response to the 
argument that this justification does not explain the 
differential treatment accorded employees with other 
non-occupational disabilities, petr falls back on Geduldig's 
characterization of pregnancy as a "voluntary" condition, not a 
true disability. "[A]n employer may rationally favor those 
employees who do not absent themselves for education, travel or 
\ 
9. 
other reasons of personal preference over those who do so 
absent themselves. Such absences are disruptive and need not be 
encouraged by the employer. (Reply Br. 3). 
Petr's justification is certainly not without reason, but I 
doubt whether it rises to the level of "business necessity" 
needed to overcome a prima facie Title VII case. Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 u.s. 424 (1971). I say this because the policy 
is not based on cost or efficiency considerations. Indeed, it 
would usually cut against efficiency to hire or promote an 
inexperienced employee over a senior worker. At bottom, petr's 
to reward 
concern is an "ideological" one: he wants/employees who exhibit 
loyalty and do not take leaves for personal junkets. This type 
not 
of rationale is ordinarily/thought sufficient to justify a 
disparate impact on a protected class. See, e.g., Sprogis v. 
United Air Line, Inc. It also offends my common sense to 
equate absence on account of pregnancy with leaves for travel 
and education. The condition of pregnancy may be voluntarily 
---..,......-
assumed in the first instance, but, as implicitly recognized by 
petr's own mandatory maternity policy (App. 43), at some point 
that condition ripens into a genuine disability. 
The question then becomes whether resp Satty has made out a 
prima facie cases consistent with Gilbert. It must be 
remembered that the decisions were below were handed down prior 
to Gilbert, and the courts proceeded on the assumption that the 
usual Title VII principles would apply to pregnancy 
classifications. 
Although resp and amici make the argument that petr's 
policy is merely a "pretext" for stereotypical thinking about 
10. 
female employees (e.g., that their devotion to the job 
terminates with the onset of pregnancy, or that their need for 
employment ceases with the birth of children). I do not think 
that the record supports this position. The argument here is 
that there is a complete absence of justification for a policy 
which is irrational and overbroad. A woman on mandatory 
maternity leave loses here job-bidding seniority "regardless of 
the length of her absence, and regardless of whether her 
absence was solely due to disability or included some period 
when she could have worked but preferred, for personal reasons 
including care of the infant, to remain at home." (AFL-CIO and 
UAW as Amici Br.l6). Of course, the absence of a reasonably 
plausible justification can be evidence of improper motivation, 
cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); NLRB v. 
Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1966); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1969). But I doubt whether a finding 
of pretextual sex-based discrimination can be squared with the 
fact that petr has asserted a plausible, if ultimately 
unpersuasive, justification, that employees returning from 
maternity leave receive temporary employment until a permanent 
position opens up and retain vacation and pension seniority, -
and that female employees are present in petr's workforce and 
in this case were the immediate beneficiaries of resp Satty's 
loss of job-bidding seniority. ~ 
d.••+·--~ 
I am inclined, however, to think that a classification ~
denying job-bidding seniority to women returning from a ~~._ 
~~·--...J­
(mandatory) maternity leave presents a prima facie case of ---
disparate impact under Gilbert. Since the facts were developed 
11. 
in a pre-Gilbert setting, the briefs do not offer aggregate 
statistics, setting forth, in some systematic fashion, the 
impact of the denial of job-bidding seniority on petr's female 
workforce. I am not sure such a showing is essential in this 
case. Unlike Griggs, we can be certain that the employer's 
maternity leave policy impacts only women. And unlike Gilbert, 
female employees as a class are likely to suffer an aggregate 
detriment, in terms of their relative seniority position 
vis-a-vis male employees. Moreover, some women may be 
discouraged from returning to their jobs because of the 
prospect of having to bid for low-seniority positions. There is 
support for the conclusion that petr's policy "is in fact worth 
more to men than to women," Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138, and that 
it has "worked to discriminate against an identifiable group or 
class," Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496. Thus, petr's failure 
demonstrate "business nec~ssity" dooms the job-bidding 
seniority restriction. 
It is true that non-pregnant female employees will 
themselves suffer no detriment, and indeed women replaced resp 
in two positions which she would have gotten had she not been 
deprived of her job-bidding seniority. However, Gilbert need 
not be read as declaring "an 'anything goes' approach to 
personnel policies regarding pregnancy" (ACLU Br. 29), simply 
because there will always be a subset of women who are not 
disadvantaged by the particular policy. Although I think a 
prima facie case can be presumed on the record of this case, 
the Court may wish to remand for further factual development on 
the question of whether petr's female employees have suffered, 
... 
in the aggregate, a disadvantage relative to petr's male 
workforce. 
12. 
ACLU, as amicus, also argues that EEOC regulations on the 
seniority issue are entitled to deference because, unlike the 
portion of the regulations effectively disregarded in Gilbert, 
the EEOC has consistently taken the view that pregnancy 
classifications impinging seniority rights violate Title VII, 
and that other federal agencies have not taken a contrary view 
(ACLU Br. 30-33). Petr disputes this characterization (Reply 
Br. 7-11), but some of the quotations referred to by petr belie 
its position (see, e.g., p. 11). 
I have not discussed the "vested rights" concept, because I 
do not think it withstands analysis. Seniority or sick leave 
pay is no more "vested" than income insurance. They are all 
terms or conditions of employment, obtained either through the 
unilateral largesse of the employer or individual or collective 
negotiations, defined by the limitations arrived at in the 
employment agreement, and subject to revision or even 
elimination in future agreements. 
C. Denial of Accumulated Paid Sick Leave (Nashville Gas; Berg) 
1. The Nature of the Plans. The Nashville Gas sick leave 
plan is, in effect, a substitute for a disability insurance 
plan (App. 13). Employees "earn" a given number of sick leave 
days for use in the future, depending on how long they remain 
continuously employed, and how often they use sick leave while 
employed. An employee may not accumulate unused sick leave from 
one year to the next. But for each year he uses no sick leave, 
he can add one week of full pay leave, up to double the full 
13. 
pay to which he is otherwise entitled (App. 97). Apparently, 
unused sick leave cannot be applied to vacation time. Pregnant 
employees can draw upon their sick leave until "pregnancy 
leave" commences. 
The plan in Berg follows Calif. Educ. Code §13468 which 
essentially provides an entitlement of "10 days' leave of 
absence for illness or injury" for every full-time employee, 
with accumulation of unused leave from one year to the next. 
Pursuant to Calif. Educ. Code §13456, which states that the 
section does not require school boards to grant sick leave pay 
to pregnant teachers, petrs in Berg adopted a policy of denying 
sick leave to employees who are not working as a result of the 
mandatory maternity leave then in effect. 
2. Similarity to Gilbert. A pregnancy classification with JA 
respect to sick leave pay is very close to the facts in Gilbert. VI 
,... 
The employer's interest in avoiding the cost of coverage 
for pregnancy -- to limit the number of occasions that may give 
rise to paid sick leave liability -- is similar to GE's in 
Gilbert. However, there are differences. Generally speaking, 
actuarial crite r ia of risk selection govern disability 
insurance, not sick leave policies. Moreover, as the AFL-CIO 
and UAW point out in their amici brief in Nashville Gas, 
Gilbert plan did not set an absolute limit set upon the number 
of sick days that could be taken in one year, but, rather, 
limited the number of days for which payments would be made for 
any single disability. See 429 U.S. at 128. In the Nashville 
Gas plan, by contrast, there is little likelihood that female 
employees will receive an extra benefit on account of 
14. 
pregnancy, because the employer sets ~ ceiling governing the 
allowance for each employee (Amici Br. 30-31). The Calif. plan 
in Berg has a similar structure, although the school board is 
given discretion to increase the allowance in a particular case. 
A disparate impact argument is more difficult to make in 
this context than in the case of denial of job-bidding 
seniority. As in Gilbert, men and women are likely to incur 
roughly the same number of reimubursible disabilities over the 
course of a year. Therefore, exclusion of pregnancy coverage, 
standing alone, does not disadvantage female employees as a 
class. On the other hand, at least in Nashville Gas, inclusion 
of pregnancy "does not destroy the presumed parity of the 
benefits accruing to men and women alike,. which results from 
the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks." Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
at 139 & n.l7 (emphasis in original). 
3. Viewing the employer's maternity policy as a whole. 
Resps in both cases argue that any perceived similarity between 
the sick leave plans in Nashville Gas and Berg and the Gilbert 
situation disappears when the denial of paid sick leave is 
viewed in the context of the employer's maternity policy as a 
whole. In part, this a "pretext" argument. Resp in Berg makes 
much of the inconsistent posture of the school board --
treating pregnancy as a disability for purposes of mandatory 
maternity leave, while denying disability status for purposes 
of sick leave pay. And resps in both cases stress the 
stereotypical thinking underlying their respective employer's 
overall policy. 
inconsistency in 
I do not think that the Court will deem \ 
the labeling of pregnancy to be sufficient 
15. 
proof of "pretext." Nor does the record support the view that 
the policies in Nashville Gas and Berg 'are explainable soley by 
reference to invidious stereotyping of female employees. The 
Be£9. plan also involves a one-day, "have a cigar" paternity 
leave. This is undeniably unjust, but hardly a linchpin for 
establishing discriminatory intent. The employer has an easy 
answer: a one-day leave is simply not as expensive as a 
pregnancy leave of several months' duration. 
The better argument here -- one which is not clearly made -
in any of the briefs and which may require a remand for factual 
development -- is that, as a factual matter, female employees - -
in the aggregate will receive less compensation than the class 
of male employees because a significant number of the former, 
but not the latter, must endure forced discontinuity of work 
without sick leave pay. (I believe J. White made this point in 
his dissent from the initial vote to deny cert. in Berg). I 
would add that inclusion of pregnancy will not lead to "unjust 
enrichment" of female employees as a class, because the paid 
sick leave ceilings will remain the same notwithstanding the 
inclusion of pregnancy as a reimbursible disability. Moreover, 
the employer's cost justification is somewhat more attenuated 
than in Gilbert because he has presumably budgeted for the 
allowable number of sick leave payments. And the employer's 
interest in continuity of employment is undercut by his 
willingness to permit disability leave generally. 
D. Mandatory Maternity Leave (Berg) 
As a theoretical matter, mandatory maternity leave policies 
should be subject to Title VII scrutiny, in terms of the 
16. 
disparate impact analysis outlined above. Women are more likely 
than men to be subject to mandatory leave and thereby suffer 
relative loss of pay and other benefits (see J. White's dissent 
from the initial vote to deny cert. in Berg). 
However, in the Berg case, the school district's interim 
policy, which became effective before resp brought suit in DC, 
established a flexible 30-day maternity leave, subject to 
extension upon a showing that an employee can continue working 
beyond that point without endangering health or interfering 
with job performance. Resp's challenge is reduced to (1) an 
attack on the requirement of a~y mandatory maternity leave at 
all, and (2) petr school district's decision to condition an 
upon submission to 
extension in resp's case I a medical examination by petr's 
physician. 
Petrs' policy would seem to satisfy a "business necessity" 
test. The interim policy provides for an individualized 
determination of disability or fitness to teach. Petrs' 
insistence that resp submit to an examination by the school 
board's doctor follows the suggestion made by way of dictum in 
Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur. The LaFleur Court noted 
that school boards "could require the pregnant teacher to 
submit to medical examination by a school board physician." 414 
u.s. at 647 n.l4. The failure to require a similar procedure 
with respect to other disabilities --a point which petr does 
not concede (Petrs' Br. 44), but which the DC decided against 
petr (Petn, App. C, at 34)-- would seem a justifiable 
classification in light of the fairly widespread, but by no 
means consensus, medical opinion concerning the disabling 
17. 
effect of pregnancy on a teacher's jo~ performance during the 
last few weeks of a pregnancy. LaFleur, 414 u.s. at 647 n.l3; 
see petrs' evidence on this point (App. 56). And few other 
disabilities are as identifiable and as predictable as 
pregnancy. In this sense, pregnancy is unique. This also 
answers the contention that pregnant women are the only 
employees who are forced to take a mandatory leave even though 
the woman and her doctor believes she is physically capable of 
working up to the expected due date. Putting to aside the DC's 
contrary finding, I would think that employers often require 
employees to undergo a company-doctor examination, and on 
occasion such an examination can result in a mandatory leave of 
absence. It would seem that resp's real complaint is with the 
the routine nature of petr's requirement in the case of 
pregnancy. 
E. The Desirability of a Remand? 
Since both cases were decided before Gilbert, when the 
courts fairly uniformly held, following the EEOC regulations on. 
point, that any disability plan which treated pregnancy 
differently than other disabilities is ~ se violative of 
Title VII, the Court may wish to vacate and remand for further 
factual development. Gilbert rejects any ~ se approach, and 
requires the plaintiff to show that the plan under attack has 
the effect, in the aggregate, of providing greater benefits for 
men than for women. Such a factual showing in terms does not 
seem to be present in either Nashville Gas or Berg. While I 
think aggregate disadvantage to female employees can be 
presumed in the case of a mandatory maternity leave policy 
il·~ ... 
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which denies affected female employees job-bidding seniority 
' 
and paid sick leave, the Court may find a remand for factual 
development appropriate. A reversal, however, would not be in 
order. In Gilbert, the Court reversed in the absence of the 
requisite showing of discriminatory purpose or effect. There, 
the record evidence showed that actual benefits provided to 
women and the cost of those benefits were equal to or greater 
than the benefits, and the attendant cost, to men. See 429 U.S. 
at 130 & n.9. Here, the inferences from the record are to the 
contrary. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I think a DIG is appropriate in No. 75-1069, Richmond 
Unified School Dist. v. Berg. In any event, I believe the DC 
had jurisdiction to issue the prelim inj. And I would affirm on 
the sick leave issue but reverse and remand on the mandatory 
maternity leave question. 
With respect to No. 75-536, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, I 
would affirm on both seniority and sick leave pay. 
S.E. 
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Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher 
Date: October 6, 1977 
Re: No. 75-536, Nashville Gas Co. v. Sat·ty; . o. 
Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg 
75-1069,/ 
I omitted to mention in my bench memorandum that 
Congress is presently considering bills to overrule General 
Electic 'Co. v. Gilbert. The Senate has reported 
out of committee S. 955, which amends Section 701 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) to define the 
terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" to 
include "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions," and provides that "women 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated f he same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits 
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work . .. . " The intent of the Senate Comm. on Human 
Resources (which I believe is the old Senate Comm. on 
Labor and Public Welfare) is a broad one, to eradicate 
the concept of "uniqueness" underlying this Court's 
decisions in Aiello and Gilbert. S. Rep. 95-331, 95th 
Cong . , 1st Sess. (July 6, 1977). 
The Senate referred S.995 to the House, but the 
House has decided to work on its own bill, H.R. 5055. 
This bill has not yet been reported out of the House 
Comm. on Education and Labor. 
I am not .suggesting mootness, but the likelihood 
of Congressional action makes a Sup. Ct. decision in these 
cases less pressing than before. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. 
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October 17, 1977 
RE: No. 75-536 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 
Dear Lewis: 
The vote in the above is unanimous on the issue of loss 
of seniority for promotional purposes but 6 to 3 on the 
question of sick leave. Thurgood, you and I are to Affirm 
and our 6 colleages to Reverse. If a dissent is indicated 
after Bill Rehnquist circulates his opinion would you be 
interested in taking it on? 
Sincerely, 
!/z{~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Mr. Justice Marshall 
October 17, lfl77 
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· Thank you for note about the above case. 
As you suggest, if a dissent is ndicat~d after 
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CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
October 28, 1977 
Re: No. 75-536 - Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to Conference 
/ 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
$5nttttntt Of.rotti .of f4t 'Jllnl:ttb ,§~.s 
Jit[asJringtcn. tB. <!f. 2.IJt?'J.l,~ 
October 28, 1977 




I am glad to join your opinion for 
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
October 31, 1977 
Re: No. 75-536 - Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
//«4 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
